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vABSTRACT
As SQL injection attack (SQLIA) continues to threaten web applications despite
several techniques recommended to prevent it, a Hybrid Threat Modeling strategy
was adopted in this research due to its proactive approach to risk mitigation in web
applications. This involved the combination of 3 threat modeling techniques namely
misuse cases, attack trees and finite state machines in order to harness their individual
strengths to design a Hybrid Threat Modeling framework and tool called MOTH
(Modeling Threats using Hybrid techniques). Using the MOTH tool developed using
Eclipse rich client platform, experimental results with an e-commerce web application
downloaded from GitHub namely BodgeIt store shows an improved SQL injection
vulnerability detection rate of 13.33% in comparison to a commercial tool, IBM
AppScan. Further benchmarking of MOTH with respect to SQL injection vulnerability
detection in both BodgeIT store and IBM’s Altoro Mutual online banking application
shows it is 30.6% more effective over AppScan. Relative to other threat modeling
tools, MOTH was able to realize a 41.7% optimization of attack paths required to
design effective test plans and test cases for the recommendation of efficient security
requirements needed to prevent SQL injection attacks. A 100% risk mitigation
was achieved after applying these recommendations due to a complete security test
coverage of all test cases during the experiment as all test cases successfully exposed
the inherent security mutants in the AUT. These results show that MOTH is a more
suitable hybrid threat modeling tool for preventing poor specifications that expose web
applications to SQL injection attacks.
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ABSTRAK
Serangan SQL Injection (SQLIA) sering terjadi dan memberi kesan kepada aplikasi-
aplikasi web walaupun pelbagai teknik telah dicadangkan untuk mengelakkan ia
berlaku. Oleh itu, strategi Hybrid Threat Modeling telah dilaksanakan di dalam
kajian ini kerana ia memiliki pendekatan proaktif untuk mengurangkan risiko
serangan SQLIA di dalam aplikasi web. Kajian ini telah menggabungkan kelebihan-
kelebihan yang terdapat di dalam 3 teknik threat modeling iaitu misuse cases,
attack trees dan finite state machines untuk menghasilkan Hybrid Threat Modeling
framework dan MOTH (Modeling Threat using Hybrid techniques) tool. MOTH
tool telah dibangunkan menggunakan platform Eclipse dan hasil keputusan ekperimen
menggunakan aplikasi web e-dagang, BodgeIt yang dimuat turun dari GitHub
menunjukkan teknik yang dicadangkan mampu mengesan serangan SQL Injection
dengan lebih baik sebanyak 13.33% berbanding tool komersial, IBM AppScan. MOTH
juga berupaya mengesan serangan SQL Injection dengan lebih baik sebanyak 30.6%
berbanding AppScan bagi aplikasi BodgeIt dan aplikasi perbankan dalam talian, Altoro
Mutual IBM. Berbanding dengan threat modeling tools yang lain, MOTH juga mampu
mengoptimumkan risiko serangan SQL injection sebanyak 41.7%. 100% pengurangan
risiko telah berjaya dicapai selepas mengaplikasikan teknik MOTH. Ini disebabkan
oleh liputan ujian keselamatan yang lengkap bagi semua test cases di dalam semua
eksperimen dan MOTH berjaya mendedahkan security mutants yang wujud di dalam
AUT. Keputusan ini menunjukkan bahawa MOTH adalah hybrid threat modeling tool
yang lebih baik dalam mencegah serangan SQL injection.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background Study
As organizations seek to fulfil their objectives in the 21st century, they have come
to immensely depend on reliable and secure software as a core component of their
organizational asset to achieve their set goals (Symantec, 2014; Amthor et al.,
2014). These software assets are system resources that have significant value to the
stakeholders of the organization (Wichers and Williams, 2013). Irrespective of the
size, nature or sector of these organizations, securing the software asset has gained
momentum (Johnson et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2014) given the explosion of software
vulnerabilities (Sultana et al., 2017) leading to major software security issues in the
form of incessant cyber-attacks to confidential data or mission critical systems which
could bring huge losses to both the organization and her customers (Kavitha et al.,
2017; Pacheco et al., 2017). These kinds of attacks include but are not limited to
SQL injection, denial of service, disclosure of confidential information and data theft
or corruption via social engineering attacks, phishing attacks, watering hole attacks,
buffer overflow or stack smashing (Pickard et al., 2012; Bozic et al., 2013; Chen et al.,
2013; Marback et al., 2013; Shar and Tan, 2013). These could push organizations
out of business due to customers’ lack of trust in using the services, mitigating laws
enacted by the government or legal issues raised by aggrieved parties for breach of
contract (Paul, 2014).
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2However, post deployment and reactive measures such as software patching
and upgrade, damage assessment, logging analysis, installation of intrusion detection
and prevention systems to mention a few have not stopped or deterred attackers from
continuously bombarding these software assets using more sophisticated attacks to
exploit the software vulnerabilities (Kar and Panigrahi, 2013; Li et al., 2017). These
myriads of unending threats have prompted software security experts to propose
proactive strategies of building security into the traditional Software Development Life
Cycle (SDLC) hence the Secure Software Development Lifecycle (SSDL) paradigm
came to life (OWASP, 2014a; Tatli, 2018). Given the unique culture and practices
of disparate IT firms, many tech giants have thrown their weight behind the creation
of proprietary software security models such as Trustworthy Computing Secure
Development Lifecycle from Microsoft (Microsoft, 2005), CLASP (Comprehensive
Lightweight Security Application Process) and Open SAMM (Software Assurance
Maturity Model) from OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) (OWASP,
2016) and Touchpoints from Cigital (McGraw, 2006). Interestingly, over 60 tech-
fortune companies such as SONY, VISA, Intel, Microsoft etc. have collaborated
to develop a descriptive framework tagged BSIMM (Building Security In Maturity
Model) (BSIMM, 2014). These new paradigms and the aggressive allocation of
resources (funds and man-power) to such projects have empowered the development
and security team to address security issues during the earliest stages of system
development (Karpati et al., 2014). In the secure software development lifecycle,
one of the critical approaches to defending the organizations software infrastructure
is to anticipate the nature of the attacks from the attacker’s perspective before they
happen and strategizing mitigation plans in order to prevent these attacks from being
successful. This is called Threat Modeling (Groves, 2013).
Threat modeling is a software security practice utilized by software developers,
architects and security experts at the design phase of software development to
document the key assets found in a software application and intentionally expose
those assets to security risks in a thorough and disciplined manner. The goal of
a threat modeling exercise is to detect hidden software vulnerabilities regarded as
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3”entry points” (Shostack, 2014) that may elude the application developers and use this
information to develop mitigation strategies thereby providing a roadmap for proactive
security plans (SecurityInnovation, 2011).
By identifying an application’s potential vulnerabilities, threat modeling helps
the development and security team to understand and prioritize the array of risks
for which these discovered vulnerabilities are susceptible in the event of an attack.
With the results of a threat model at hand, development teams can ensure that
they are concentrating their design, implementation or testing efforts on the risks
that matter most considering the direct or indirect impact of such risks on the
business (SecurityInnovation, 2011). In a nutshell, identifying threats during the
threat modelling exercise helps software security engineers come up with realistic and
valuable security requirements (Myagmar et al., 2005). These security requirements
are constraints that govern the intended behaviour of a software application in
accordance with the security goals and policies set by the organization (Haley et al.,
2008). Therefore, threat modeling is vital for software vulnerability detection and
prevention.
Given the above premises, researchers have proposed many methods for
developing threat models such as the use of attack trees (Swideski and Snider, 2004),
threat nets (Dianxiang et al., 2012) a formal specification method adapted from Petri
Nets, use of sequence diagrams to monitor possible threats during program execution
(Wang et al., 2007), finite state machines for modeling software objects behavior (Chen
et al., 2003) and Misuse cases, a variation of the UML Use Case model (Sindre and
Opdahl, 2005a). In the field of software security testing, this approach has also been
used by Wang (Wang et al., 2007) and Dianxiang (Dianxiang et al., 2012) to test for
software security in the design phase of the software development. Marback et al.
(2013) successfully applied attack trees to generate security test cases which might
help in identifying threats capable of compromising security.
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41.2 Research Motivation
Over the years, many researchers have taken threat modeling a step further by
experimentally comparing these modeling techniques especially attack trees and
misuse cases. This was done in order to discover the possibility of combining them
as an hybrid for complementary use or rather substitute them as alternatives (Opdahl
and Sindre, 2009).
One of the earliest Hybrid Threat Modeling (HTM) tools developed by a
community of researchers in the academic and industry to resolve software security
issues was SeaMonster (Meland et al., 2008). It was created in order to bridge the
communication gap between security experts and software developers as a means to
enhance knowledge sharing about software vulnerabilities. Misuse case and attack tree
threat models were used in SeaMonster to connect different aspect of every detected
vulnerability so as to understand the causes of these vulnerabilities, threats liable to
exploit them and mitigation strategies to prevent their successful exploitation (Meland
et al., 2008).
These two techniques were chosen by many researchers because they both
focused mainly on what the attacker is trying to achieve, and in turn provide mitigation
strategies to foil the attack (Karpati et al., 2014; Mai et al., 2018). An experiment
was performed by Opdahl and Sindre (2009) using software engineering students
to measure effectiveness, coverage, perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use and
intention to use of both threat modeling techniques i.e. Attack trees and Misuse Cases.
Although, the result showed that attack trees, when compared to misuse cases, were
more efficient in identifying threats particularly those related to confidentiality and
authorization, however, manual inspection of the experimental results indicated that
both techniques are complementary to an extent (Opdahl and Sindre, 2009). Further
experiments were needed to clarify the complementary nature of these techniques
hence Karpati et al. (2014) embarked on an experiment to compare attack trees and
misuse cases in an industrial setting taking his experimental and control group from
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